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NUCLEAR WEAPONS BEFORE THE 
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A CRITIQUE OF THE MARSHALL 
ISLANDS V UNITED KINGDOM DECISION  
Devesh Awmee* 
The International Court of Justice recently gave judgment in Obligations Concerning Negotiations 
Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament. The case concerned 
three parallel claims brought by the Marshall Islands against India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom 
for their alleged failure to fulfil obligations concerning negotiations relating to the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament under art VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
customary international law. The Court in all three proceedings dismissed the claims at the 
preliminary objections phase on the sole ground that a legal dispute did not exist between the parties. 
In determining whether a legal dispute existed, the Court appears to have deviated from the objective 
determination taken in its previous jurisprudence by introducing, for the first time, a new requirement 
of "awareness". The Court also failed to address the other preliminary objections brought by the 
United Kingdom such as the Monetary Gold principle, which appears to have been a more credible 
avenue for the Court to dismiss the case. The case illustrates the failure by the Court to yet again 
confront the issue of nuclear weapons.  
I INTRODUCTION 
On 5 October 2016, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) handed down its judgment in three 
parallel proceedings regarding nuclear disarmament in its decision in Obligations Concerning 
Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament.1 The 
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1  Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections) [2016] ICJ Rep 833 [Marshall 
Islands v United Kingdom]; Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms 
Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v India) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [2016] ICJ Rep 
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cases brought by the Marshall Islands concerned alleged breaches of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)2 and customary international law by the United Kingdom, 
India and Pakistan (as respondents). The Court, in a majority judgment, declined to exercise its 
jurisdiction to determine the cases on the basis that no legal dispute existed between the parties.3  
This is the third time the ICJ has confronted an issue regarding nuclear weapons.4 There was hope 
that the ICJ would provide its opinion on the issue, particularly since there was momentum by a 
majority of the members of the United Nations (UN) to negotiate a treaty prohibiting nuclear 
weapons.5 Instead, the Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction on the sole ground of there being no 
legal dispute between the parties.6 The case is significant for the following three reasons. First, in 
determining whether a dispute existed between the parties, the Court diverted from the objective 
approach taken in previous cases. Secondly, this is the third time the Court has had the opportunity to 
deal with the issue of nuclear weapons. Finally, the case shows that the role of the ICJ in cases 
involving nuclear weapons is obsolete and that it is a matter which can only be resolved politically. 
This article will present and critique the judgment of the ICJ. To this end, Part II will introduce 
the history and emergence of a nuclear weapons regime at international law. Part III will outline the 
factual background of the case and the arguments of the parties. Part IV will briefly outline the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ and the approach taken by the ICJ in determining the existence of a dispute. It 
will also outline other nuclear weapon issues which have come before the ICJ. Part V will set out the 
decision of the ICJ. Part VI will critique the Court's reasoning. It will argue that the Court should not 
have introduced the requirement of "awareness" in determining whether a dispute exists. Moreover, 
it will argue that the Court ought to have dismissed the case because the legal interests of other nuclear 
weapon states who were absent in these proceedings formed the subject matter of the decision.7 
  
255 [Marshall Islands v India]; and Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the 
Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v Pakistan) (Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility) [2016] ICJ Rep 552 [Marshall Islands v Pakistan].  
2  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 729 UNTS 161 (opened for signature 1 July 1968, 
entered into force 5 March 1970) [NPT]. 
3  Subject to context, "Court" refers to the majority.  
4  See Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 457 [New Zealand v France 1974]; Nuclear 
Tests Case (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 253 [Australia v France 1974]; Request for an Examination 
of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the 
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France) Case [1995] ICJ Rep 288 [New Zealand v France 1995]; and Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226 [1996 Advisory Opinion].  
5  Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations GA Res 70/33, A/Res/70/33 (2015).  
6  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at 900 per Judge Bennouna dissenting.  
7  Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v France, United Kingdom and United States) 
(Preliminary Objections) [1954] ICJ Rep 19 [Monetary Gold] at 32. 
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Finally, Part VII will address the future of nuclear weapons and focus on the ICJ's capability to deal 
with such issues. It will also address the reality of achieving nuclear disarmament. Although the case 
also raises issues of state responsibility, this issue is beyond the scope of this article.  
II THE EMERGENCE OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGIME  
Many nations have felt the wrath and flow on effects of nuclear weapons ever since two bombs 
fell over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Since then, there have been a further 2,053 nuclear 
explosions in the manufacturing or testing of nuclear weapons.8 As of 2017, there are around 15,000 
nuclear weapons known to exist.9 This number is likely to increase because of the escalation of Iran's 
and North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programme.10 Countries are also likely to continue 
upgrading and increasing their nuclear arsenals.11 
The threat of nuclear weapons has not been ignored.12 The Security Council has declared that 
nuclear weapons are a threat to international peace and security.13 A majority of the General Assembly 
has also shown its concern and disapproval of nuclear weapons. It has expressly proclaimed the use 
of nuclear weapons as a direct violation of the UN Charter and international law,14 with some stating 
that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is to eliminate all nuclear weapons.15 The effect of 
  
8  Alessandra Pietrobon "Nuclear Powers' Disarmament Obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Interactions between Soft Law and 
Hard Law" (2014) 27 LJIL 169 at 170.  
9  Hans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris "Status of World Nuclear Forces" (8 July 2017) Federation of 
American Scientists <www.fas.org>. 
10  SC Res 2371, S/Res/2371 (2017). See also Peter Kenyon "Did Iran's Ballistic Missile Test Violate a UN 
Resolution?" (3 February 2017) National Public Radio <www.npr.org>.  
11  WJ Hennigan and Ralph Vartabedian "Upgrading US nuclear missiles, as Russia and China modernize, would 
cost $85 billion. Is it time to quit the ICBM race?" Los Angeles Times (online ed, Los Angeles, 30 May 2017). 
12  Tom Coppen The Law of Arms Control and the International Non-proliferation Regime (Brill, Leiden, 2016) 
at 1. 
13  SC Res 1540, S/Res/1540 (2004); SC Res 1977, S/Res/1977 (2011); SC Res 2094, S/Res/2094 (2013); and 
SC Res 2105, S/Res/2105 (2013). 
14  Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermos-nuclear weapons GA Res 1653, XVI (1961); 
Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War GA Res 33/71B, A/Res/33/71B (1978); Non-
Use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War GA Res 34/83G, A/Res/34/83G (1979); Non-Use of 
Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War GA Res 35/152D, A/Res/35/152D (1980); Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 46/37D, A/Res/46/37D (1991); Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 65/80, A/Res/65/80 (2010); Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 70/62, A/Res/70/62 (2015); and Universal Declaration 
on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World GA Res 70/57, A/Res/70/57 (2015).  
15  Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons GA Res 70/56, A/Res/70/56 (2015); and Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the 
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these resolutions indicates the support and development of a legal regime and a customary 
international law obligation prohibiting nuclear weapons and achieving disarmament.16  
The drive by a majority of UN members to create a legal regime governing nuclear weapons is 
further reflected through several multilateral treaties,17 the most significant ones being the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)18 and recently the negotiated Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.19 
A Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
The NPT entered into force in March 1970.20 It is the only instrument containing norms on non-
proliferation and nuclear disarmament which apply nearly universally due to its expansive 
membership.21 Parties to the NPT are divided into nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear 
weapon states (NNWS).22 Article VI codifies the treaty's disarmament objective. It obliges NWS to:23 
… pursue negotiation in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at 
an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control.  
  
International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons GA Res 69/43, 
A/Res/69/43 (2014). 
16  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [44] per Judge Cançado Trindade dissenting; and 1996 
Advisory Opinion, above n 4, at 255. See also Anguel Anastassov "Are Nuclear Weapons Illegal? The Role 
of Public International Law and the International Court of Justice" (2010) 15 JCSL 65 at 72.  
17  See Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (opened for signature 24 September 1996, not yet in force); 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2445 UNTS 89 (opened for 
signature 14 September 2005, entered into force 7 July 2007); Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the 
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 480 UNTS 43 (opened for signature 5 August 1963, entered 
into force 10 October 1963); and Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and 
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof 955 UNTS 
115 (opened for signature 11 February 1971, entered into force 18 May 1972).  
18  NPT, above n 2. 
19  Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (opened for signature 20 September 2017, not yet in force). 
20  United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)" 
<www.un.org>. 
21  As of May 2018, 191 states are party to the NPT.  
22  NPT, above n 2, arts I–II. 
23  Article VI.  
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The interpretation of art VI has differed between NWS and NNWS as to what measures are needed 
to comply with it.24 NWS interpret it as emphasising the reduction of nuclear arms, while NNWS 
interpret it as an obligation to achieve a specific result of nuclear disarmament.25 According to the 
ICJ, art VI goes beyond "a mere obligation of conduct".26 Instead, the obligation under this article 
imposes a positive obligation to "achieve a precise result" of nuclear disarmament through 
negotiations in good faith.27 Therefore, just paying lip service to the idea of negotiations does not 
suffice.28 This interpretation was upheld at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.29 
The original life span of the NPT was 25 years.30 However, in 1995, states agreed to extend the 
duration of the NPT indefinitely.31 Since entering into force, the NPT has been successful in curtailing 
nuclear proliferation. A recent study has shown that NPT ratification has significantly reduced the 
probability that states will pursue or acquire nuclear weapons.32 As of 2018, four out of the nine NWS 
are still not party to the NPT.33  
B Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by a majority of UN members in 
July 2017.34 It is the first multilateral legally binding instrument for nuclear disarmament to have been 
negotiated.35 It was adopted by a vote of 122 in favour of the Treaty.36 The Netherlands voted against 
  
24  Daniel H Joyner "The Legal Meaning and Implications of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty" in Gro 
Nystuen, Stuart Casey-Maslen and Annie Golden Bersagel Nuclear Weapons under International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) 397 at 397. 
25  At 404.  
26  1996 Advisory Opinion, above n 4, at [99].  
27  At [99]. 
28  Joyner, above n 24, at 417. 
29  2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol I) (2010) at [79].  
30  NPT, above n 2, art X(2).  
31  1995 Review and Extension of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) (1995). 
32  See Matthew Fuhrmann and Yonatan Lupu "Do Arms Control Treaties Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty" (2016) 60 ISQ 530 at 533.  
33  These states include India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea.  
34  UN News "UN Member States set to adopt 'historic' treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons" (6 July 2017) 
<https://news.un.org>. 
35  UN News, above n 34.  
36  UN News "UN conference adopts treaty banning nuclear weapons" (7 July 2017) <https://news.un.org>. 
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it and Singapore abstained.37 The Treaty opened for signature in September 2017.38 It must be ratified 
by 50 states to enter into force.39 As of May 2018, 58 states have signed the Treaty and 10 have 
ratified it.40 It is important to note that none of these states are NWS. 
The Treaty emphasises an attempt by a majority of the international community to create a legal 
regime against nuclear weapons. Article 1 outlines the prohibitions imposed on each state once they 
become party to the Treaty. Each state party undertakes to never under any circumstances develop, 
manufacture, test, transfer, receive, and use nuclear weapons.41 The Treaty also requires state parties 
who possess nuclear weapons to destroy them.42 These obligations are to be implemented and 
enforced by each state party taking legal and administrative action to sanction nuclear weapon 
activities within their territories.43 State parties are also required to cooperate and meet regularly to 
facilitate the implementation of the Treaty and ensure that their obligations are (being) fulfilled.44 
Despite this attempt to create a comprehensive legal regime, it must be noted that NWS and many 
of their allies did not take part in the negotiations.45 Notable of these countries were the United States, 
United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.46 Unfortunately, 
this continued tension between NWS and NNWS hampers an attempt to create a successful legal 
regime and prevents the emergence of a customary prohibition.47 However, it has been acknowledged 
that:48 
While the treaty itself will not immediately eliminate any nuclear weapons, the treaty can, over time, 
further delegitimize nuclear weapons and strengthen the legal and political norm against their use. 
  
37  UN News, above n 36. 
38  Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, above n 19, art 13. 
39  Article 15.  
40  United Nations Treaty Collection "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons" (27 May 2018) 
<www.treaties.un.org>. 
41  Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, above n 19, art 1. 
42  Article 4(2). 
43  Article 5. 
44  Articles 7(1) and 8(1). 
45  Nuclear Threat Initiative "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons" (13 July 2017) <www.nti.org>. 
46  Rick Gladstone "The UN Adopts a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons. Now Comes the Hard Part" The New 
York Times (New York, 8 July 2017) at A7.  
47  1996 Advisory Opinion, above n 4, at [73]. 
48  Daryl G Kimball "New Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty Marks a Turning Point" (7 July 2017) Arms 
Control Association <www.armscontrol.org>.  
 A CRITIQUE OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS V UNITED KINGDOM DECISION 59 
III THE EMERGENCE OF THE DISPUTE 
A History 
It is important to acknowledge the Marshall Islands' experience with nuclear weapons to illustrate 
the driving forces behind their proceedings. After World War II, the United States was responsible 
for administering and looking after the welfare of the Marshall Islands. Yet, between 1946 and 1958, 
the United States tested 67 nuclear weapons in the Marshall Islands.49 The effects of these detonations 
have left parts of the Marshall Islands uninhabitable to this day.50 The Marshallese people also 
continue to suffer one of the highest rates of thyroid cancer and birth defects related to radiation in 
the world.51 However, despite these tragedies, there appears to be no evidence available to show that 
the Marshall Islands ever raised any of their concerns about nuclear weapons directly with any of the 
NWS prior to filing proceedings before the ICJ.  
B Proceedings before the ICJ 
On 24 April 2014, the Marshall Islands filed proceedings in the Registry of the Court against the 
United Kingdom, China, North Korea, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the United States.52 
The Marshall Islands alleged that these states breached their obligations to fulfil negotiations relating 
to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament under art VI of the NPT and 
international customary law.53 However, only the proceedings against the United Kingdom, Pakistan 
and India proceeded as they were the only three states that made optional declarations recognising the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to art 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice 1945 (the Statute).54 Proceedings against the other states did not proceed on the ground that 
those states, after being invited to do so, did not consent to the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to 
art 38(5) of the International Court of Justice Rules of Court 1978.55  
  
49  Kim Skoog "US Nuclear Testing on the Marshall Islands: 1946 to 1958" (2003) 3 Teaching Ethics 67 at 67.  
50  "Bikini Atoll nuclear test: 60 years later and islands still unliveable" The Guardian (online ed, United 
Kingdom, 2 March 2014).  
51  United Nations Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Implications for Human 
Rights of the Environmentally Sound Management and Disposal of Hazardous Substances and Wastes on his 
Mission to the Marshall Islands and the United States of America 21/48/Add.1, A/HRC/21/48/Add.1 (2012) 
at [30]–[31]. 
52  International Court of Justice "The Republic of the Marshall Islands Files Applications against nine States for 
their alleged failure to fulfil their obligations with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament" (press release, 25 April 2014). 
53  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [22] per the majority. 
54  At [22] per the majority. 
55  At [22] per the majority. 
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The Marshall Islands claimed the three respondent states failed to meet their obligations to 
negotiate the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in good faith.56 This 
obligation was alleged to derive from art VI of the NPT and customary international law.57 It was also 
alleged that efforts by the three respondent states to modernise and maintain their nuclear arsenal had 
breached art VI and customary international law.58 The Marshall Islands and the United Kingdom are 
parties to the NPT while Pakistan and India are not. Due to the constraints of this article, only the 
proceedings against the United Kingdom will be dealt with.  
The Marshall Islands was seeking that the Court declare that the United Kingdom was in breach 
of its obligations and that the Court order the United Kingdom to take all steps necessary to comply 
with its obligations under art VI of the NPT and customary international law.59 
C Arguments of the Parties 
Before proceeding to the merits, the ICJ must first give judgment on any preliminary objections 
raised by the respondent challenging the Court's jurisdiction.60 The case before the Court was at the 
preliminary objections phase as the United Kingdom had filed preliminary objections challenging the 
Court's jurisdiction and the admissibility of the claims put forward by the Marshall Islands.  
1 United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom advanced, inter alia, the argument that the Court had no jurisdiction to 
proceed with the case on the grounds that the Marshall Islands had failed to show the existence of a 
dispute between the parties with respect to an alleged failure to pursue negotiations in good faith 
towards the cessation of nuclear arms and nuclear disarmament.61 The United Kingdom argued that 
an applicant must give prior notice of its claims to the respondent to establish a dispute.62 It relied on 
art 43 of the International Law Commission's articles on the Responsibility of States for 
  
56  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [11] per the majority; Marshall Islands v India, above n 1, 
at [11] per the majority; and Marshall Islands v Pakistan, above n 1, at [11] per the majority.  
57  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [11] per the majority; Marshall Islands v India, above n 1, 
at [11] per the majority; and Marshall Islands v Pakistan, above n 1, at [11] per the majority. 
58  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [11] per the majority; Marshall Islands v India, above n 1, 
at [11] per the majority; and Marshall Islands v Pakistan, above n 1, at [11] per the majority. 
59  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [11] per the majority.  
60  International Court of Justice Rules of Court 1978, art 79(9).  
61  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [23] per the majority. 
62  At [27] per the majority. 
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Internationally Wrongful Acts, which states that "[a]n injured State which invokes the responsibility 
of another State shall give notice of its claim to that State."63  
The United Kingdom also put forward four other preliminary objections.64 However, the Court 
regrettably did not address these.65 Of interest to this article, one of these arguments, acknowledged 
by a few of the judges, was that the Court should have refused to exercise its jurisdiction because the 
legal interests of other NWS, who were absent in these proceedings, would have formed the subject 
matter of the decision.66 This is known as the Monetary Gold principle.67 It will be addressed in Part 
VI.  
2 Marshall Islands  
As the case was at the preliminary objections phase, the Court only focused on the existence of a 
dispute and not on the substance of the case.68 Therefore, the Marshall Islands did not discuss its 
nuclear weapon concerns. The Marshall Islands contended that a dispute did exist, arguing that 
statements made in multilateral settings prior to the filing of the application had established the 
existence of a dispute with the United Kingdom.69 For instance, during a General Assembly meeting 
in September 2013, the Marshall Islands had urged all NWS "to intensify efforts to address their 
responsibilities in moving towards an effective and secure disarmament".70 A further statement by 
the Marshall Islands at an international conference in Nayarit in February 2014 asserted that "States 
possessing nuclear arsenals are failing to fulfil their legal obligations" under customary international 
law and art VI of the NPT.71 The United Kingdom was not present at this conference.72 
The Marshall Islands also argued that the voting records in multilateral fora regarding nuclear 
weapons demonstrated the existence of a legal dispute.73 It particularly relied on General Assembly 
  
63  Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts [2001] vol 2 pt 2 YILC 26 at 29.  
64  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [23] per the majority.  
65  At [58] per the majority.  
66  At [39] per Judge Tomka (separate opinion), [11] per Judge Xue, [18]–[19] per Judge Bhandari and [32]–[33] 
per Judge Crawford dissenting.  
67  Monetary Gold, above n 7, at 32.  
68  Dan Ciobanu Preliminary Objections: Related to the Jurisdiction of the United Nations Political Organs 
(Springer, Netherlands, 1975) at 62. 
69  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [48] per the majority.  
70  At [49] per the majority. 
71  At [50] per the majority. 
72  At [28] per the majority. 
73  At [35] per the majority. 
62 (2018) 49 VUWLR 
Resolution 68/32, where the General Assembly called for the "urgent compliance with the legal 
obligations and the fulfilment of the commitments undertaken on nuclear disarmament".74 The 
Marshall Islands voted in favour of the resolution while the United Kingdom voted against it.75 
Alternatively, the Marshall Islands argued that the filing of the application itself and the opposing 
views expressed by the United Kingdom during the ICJ proceedings were enough to demonstrate the 
existence of a dispute.76 
IV THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
The ICJ is a legal organ of the UN.77 It is the successor to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ). Its scope is to ascertain and decide legal disputes between states in accordance with 
international law.78  
A Jurisdiction of the ICJ 
All UN members have access to the ICJ.79 However, for the ICJ to exercise its competence, states 
must consent to its jurisdiction.80 The justification for this derives from the concept that states are 
sovereign.81 Sovereignty allows a state to choose whether to allow a superior authority to take a 
decision of a state's affairs out of its hands.82 
Consent can be in the form of an agreement where the states have agreed to have their dispute 
settled by the ICJ.83 It can also derive from a jurisdiction clause in a treaty which both states are party 
to.84 A state can also be invited to consent to the jurisdiction of the Court under art 38(5) of the 
International Court of Justice Rules of Court.85 Consent can also be obtained through a doctrine 
  
74  Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament GA Res 68/32, 
A/Res/68/32 (2013) at [2]. 
75  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [55] per the majority.  
76  At [46] per the majority.  
77  Hugh Thirlway The International Court of Justice (Oxford University Press, New York, 2016) at 3. 
78  Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945, art 38(1).  
79  Thirlway, above n 77, at 3.  
80  JG Merrills International Dispute Settlement (5th ed, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011) at 116. 
81  Robert Kolb The International Court of Justice (Hart Publishing, Portland (OR), 2013) at 370. 
82  At 370. 
83  Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 36(1). See also Shabtai Rosenne The World Court: What It Is 
and How It Works (4th ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989) at 84. 
84  Merrills, above n 80, at 117.  
85  International Court of Justice Rules of Court, art 38(5). 
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known as forum prorogatum.86 This doctrine allows consent to be obtained without any formal 
statement of acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction.87 Thus, if the respondent state's conduct amounts 
to "an unequivocal indication" of its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, then this can amount to 
consent.88 
A state can also give its consent through an "optional clause" declaration, which recognises the 
Court has compulsory jurisdiction in all legal disputes with other states that have accepted the Court's 
jurisdiction.89 These declarations can be accompanied by reservations that allow a state to set 
conditions and limitations on the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction.90 If consent is given through an 
"optional clause" declaration, then this does not stop a respondent state from raising preliminary 
objections to prevent the case from proceeding to the merits.91 The Marshall Islands and the United 
Kingdom have consented to the ICJ's jurisdiction through an "optional clause" declaration.92 
B The ICJ and the Existence of Disputes between States 
The jurisdiction of the ICJ in inter-state disputes is of an adversarial nature. It extends only to 
"legal disputes" between states, making the existence of one a key requirement.93 The test for a dispute 
is minimal and does not entertain a demanding threshold.94 The Statute states that the Court will 
exercise its jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, a question of 
international law, the existence of any fact that would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation, or the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation.95 
  
86  Merrills, above n 80, at 118.  
87  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Conga v Rwanda) (Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility) [2006] ICJ Rep 6 at [21] per the majority. 
88  At [21] per the majority.  
89  Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 36(2). 
90  Article 36(3). See also Vanda Lamm Compulsory Jurisdiction in International Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham, 2014) at 61–62. 
91  International Court of Justice Rules of Court, art 79.  
92  See "Declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory: Marshall Islands" (24 April 2013) 
International Court of Justice <www.icj-cij.org>; and "Declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court 
as compulsory: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" (22 February 2017) International 
Court of Justice <www.icj-cij.org>. 
93  Andreas Zimmermann "Article 35" in Andreas Zimmermann and others (eds) The Statute of the International 
Court of Justice: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, New York, 2006) 565 at 587.  
94  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [2] per Judge Crawford dissenting.  
95  Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 36(2). 
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The meaning of "legal dispute" is not defined in the Statute. In the Mavrommatis decision, the 
PCIJ defined dispute as "a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests 
between two persons".96 This definition has been upheld without significant modification by the ICJ, 
except that it has now been clarified that a dispute can exist among more than two states.97 The 
determination of a dispute has been particularised in later ICJ cases. The ICJ has stated in the South 
West Africa cases that it must be shown that "the claim of one party is positively opposed by the 
other".98 It has been emphasised that the existence of a dispute is a matter for objective determination 
and it is not enough for one party to assert that there is a dispute.99 A conflict based on political 
grounds would not suffice.100 However, this will not deprive the Court of its competence to hear a 
case on a legal dispute which contains political elements.101 Furthermore, the fact that a state appears 
to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court does not mean there is a dispute.102 
C ICJ, Disputes and Nuclear Weapons 
The Court has had the opportunity to address disputes regarding nuclear weapons in the Nuclear 
Test Cases of 1974 and 1995.103 The Court has also had the opportunity to exercise its advisory 
function in respect of the legality of nuclear weapons.104 However, the reasoning and conclusions in 
these decisions show that the Court has been reluctant to engage with nuclear weapon related 
questions.105 This section will outline the cases and advisory opinion.  
  
96  The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v United Kingdom) (Jurisdiction) (1924) PCIJ (series A) 
No 2 at 11.  
97  Certain Property (Liechtenstein v Germany) (Preliminary Objections) [2005] ICJ Rep 6 at 18. 
98  South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa) (Preliminary Objections)  [1962] 
ICJ Rep 319 at 328.  
99  Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep 
65 at 74. 
100  Christian Tomuschat "Article 36" in Andreas Zimmermann and others (eds) The Statute of the International 
Court of Justice: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, New York, 2006) 589 at 597.  
101  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) (Merits) [1986] 
ICJ Rep 14 [Nicaragua v United States] at [33]. 
102  Kolb, above n 81, at 316. 
103  See New Zealand v France 1974, above n 4; Australia v France 1974, above n 4; and New Zealand v France 
1995, above n 4. 
104  See 1996 Advisory Opinion, above n 4.  
105  Surabhi Ranganathan "Nuclear Weapons and the Court" (2017) 111 AJIL 88 at 88.  
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1 Nuclear tests cases 
This case was brought to the ICJ by New Zealand and Australia. It concerned atmospheric nuclear 
tests being conducted by France in the South Pacific. New Zealand contended, inter alia, that these 
tests violated the rights of New Zealand and other states to not have radioactive material enter its 
territory, air space and territorial waters.106 Australia contended that it was seeking to protect the life 
and well-being of Australian citizens and other states against nuclear tests.107 It must be noted that 
the Court was not asked to discuss the illegality of nuclear weapons or nuclear disarmament. Instead, 
New Zealand and Australia sought for the ICJ to declare that nuclear tests were contrary to their rights 
under international law.108 
The Court held that a dispute no longer existed between New Zealand, Australia and France.109 
This is because soon after the proceedings started, France voluntarily announced that it no longer 
planned to continue atmospheric testing in the South Pacific.110 Therefore, the Court did not proceed 
to give a decision on the merits; the claims of New Zealand and Australia no longer had "any 
object".111 However, the judgment reserved the right for the Court to reopen the case.112 
New Zealand filed an application to reopen the case in 1995. However, France, this time, was 
conducting underground nuclear tests as opposed to atmospheric tests.113 The ICJ dismissed the 
application to reopen the case.114 The Court held that the complaint was directed against underground 
nuclear tests and did not fit into the caveat of the 1974 judgment, which concerned atmospheric 
nuclear tests only.115  
The Court was not persuasive in deciding to not reopen the case.116 The relevant passages of the 
1974 judgment were written in general terms and did not mention that New Zealand was restricted to 
  
106  New Zealand v France 1974, above n 4, at 464. 
107  Australia v France 1974, above n 4, at 261.  
108  New Zealand v France 1974, above n 4, at 460; and Australia v France 1974, above n 4, at 256.  
109  New Zealand v France 1974, above n 4, at 476; and Australia v France 1974, above n 4, at 271. 
110  New Zealand v France 1974, above n 4, at 476; and Australia v France 1974, above n 4, at 271. 
111  New Zealand v France 1974, above n 4, at 476; and Australia v France 1974, above n 4, at 271. 
112  New Zealand v France 1974, above n 4, at 477; and Australia v France 1974, above n 4, at 272. 
113  Craig R Whitney "France Planning Nuclear Tests Despite Opposition, Chirac Says" The New York Times 
(New York, 14 June 1995) at A3. 
114  New Zealand v France 1995, above n 4, at 307.  
115  At 306.  
116  Stephen M Tokarz "A Golden Opportunity Dismissed: The New Zealand v France Nuclear Tests Case" (1998) 
26 Denv J Intl L & Poly 745 at 757. 
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filing an application to reopen the case for atmospheric tests only.117 Also, the application by New 
Zealand in the 1974 case did not specify atmospheric nuclear tests, but referred to nuclear tests 
generally.118 Thus, the Court appears to adopt a narrow approach when determining whether to decide 
issues of global importance.119  
2 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons 
The 1996 Advisory Opinion is important as it demonstrated the lack of courage by the ICJ to 
satisfactorily address the issue of nuclear weapons.120 Initially there were two requests for an advisory 
opinion made by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the General Assembly under art 65 of 
the Statute. The WHO requested the Court to advise on the question of the legality of the use of 
nuclear weapons during armed conflict "in view of their health and environmental effects".121 The 
Court found it was unable to give an advisory opinion because the request did not relate to a question 
arising "within the scope of [the] activities" of the WHO.122  
The General Assembly requested the ICJ to determine whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons in any circumstance was permitted under international law.123 The Court accepted the 
request to deliver an advisory opinion.124 At the time, the Court accepted there was no treaty or 
international instrument explicitly prohibiting nuclear weapons.125 However, the Court acknowledged 
the catastrophic characteristics of nuclear weapons and the threat they pose to future generations.126 
It was also found that nuclear weapons did not discriminate between civilian and military targets and 
caused unnecessary suffering, thus violating, in theory, "cardinal principles" of the Law of Armed 
  
117  At 756.  
118  New Zealand v France 1974, above n 4, at 466.  
119  See East Timor (Portugal v Australia) (Judgment) [1995] ICJ Rep 90. The Court refused to hear the case 
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120  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [171] per Judge Cançado Trindade dissenting.  
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at [21]. 
122  At [31]. 
123  Request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons GA Res 49/75K, A/Res/49/75K (1994). 
124  1996 Advisory Opinion, above n 4, at [19]. 
125  At [33]. 
126  At [35]. 
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Conflict.127 Nevertheless, by a frail majority vote requiring the casting vote of the President,128 the 
Court controversially and ambiguously held two propositions:129 
(1) "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law"; and 
(2) "the Court cannot conclude definitely whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful 
or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would 
be at stake." 
In perhaps the only meaningful pronouncement in the advisory opinion, the Court was unanimous 
in acknowledging the importance and the binding legal obligation to pursue negotiations relating to 
nuclear disarmament under art VI of the NPT.130  
V DECISION OF THE COURT IN MARSHALL ISLANDS V 
UNITED KINGDOM 
The Court ultimately held, in a rather short judgment, and by the narrowest of majorities requiring 
the casting vote of the President,131 that it had no jurisdiction under art 36(2) of the Statute to proceed 
with the case as there was no dispute.132 Vice-President Yusuf and Judges Tomka, Bennouna, 
Cançado Trindade, Sebutinde, Robinson, Crawford, and ad hoc Bedjaoui dissented on this point. The 
reasoning of the Court will now be set out. 
A Jurisdiction 
The Court began its reasoning by stating that under art 36(2), the ICJ has jurisdiction over "legal 
disputes"133 between states who have made "optional clause" declarations accepting the compulsory 
  
127  At [78]. See Gary D Solis The Law of Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010) at ch 
7 for an overview of the core principles of the Law of Armed Conflict.  
128  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [165] per Judge Cançado Trindade dissenting; and Dale 
Stephens "Human Rights and Armed Conflict – The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice 
in the Nuclear Weapons Case" (2001) 4 YHRDJ 1 at 14. 
129  1996 Advisory Opinion, above n 4, at [105] (emphasis added). 
130  At [103].  
131  See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 55(2). 
132  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [59] per the majority. 
133  At [36] per the majority.  
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jurisdiction of the Court.134 Thus, the existence of a dispute between states is a condition of the Court's 
jurisdiction.135 
B Dismissal of the United Kingdom's Argument Regarding Prior Notice 
At the outset, the Court rejected the argument that the Marshall Islands must give prior "notice of 
its claim" in compliance with art 43 of the International Law Commission's articles on the 
Responsibility of the States for Internationally Wrongful Acts to show the existence of a dispute.136 
The Court emphasised that prior notice was not required to show the existence of a dispute.137 The 
Court also held that art 43 was irrelevant because it was not concerned with questions regarding the 
ICJ's jurisdiction or the conditions for the admissibility of cases brought before the Court.138  
C The Requirements for the Existence of a Dispute 
The Court rehearsed the requirements to establish the existence of a dispute, emphasising that the 
determination of one is a matter of substance, not form.139 The Court also accepted the definitions of 
"dispute" in the Mavrommatis and South West Africa cases.140 Furthermore, the Court stated that two 
parties must "hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-
performance of certain international obligations".141 The existence of a dispute can be ascertained 
from statements, including statements made in multilateral settings, by the parties, or documents 
exchanged between them prior to the filing of an application, or by the failure of a state to respond to 
claims in circumstances where a response is expected.142 Conduct subsequent to the application being 
filed may be relevant to confirm or deny the existence of a dispute.143 It is also emphasised that prior 
notification, or a formal diplomatic protest by the applicant are not necessary prerequisites for the 
  
134  At [36] per the majority. 
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137  At [45] per the majority. 
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above n 63, at 29. 
139  Marshall Islands v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [38] per the majority.  
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existence of a dispute.144 Ultimately, the existence of a dispute "is a matter for objective determination 
by the Court which must turn on an examination of the facts".145  
In addition to the established jurisprudence on the requirements for establishing a dispute, the 
Court seems to have added for the first time a new requirement of "awareness"146 by relying on two 
recent cases.147 This requirement states that for a dispute to exist, it must be "demonstrated, on the 
basis of evidence, that the respondent was aware, or could not have been unaware, that its views were 
'positively opposed' by the applicant".148 This new requirement is problematic and will be analysed 
in Part VI because it is at the core of the majority's decision.  
D Reasons for Finding that No Dispute Existed 
The Court ultimately rejected the arguments put forward by the Marshall Islands. First, the Court 
stated that the statements invoked by the Marshall Islands were not sufficient to demonstrate the 
existence of a dispute.149 The statement made in September 2013 was found to be "formulated in 
hortatory terms" and could not be understood to be an allegation that the United Kingdom was in 
breach of its obligations.150 It also did not specifically identify the United Kingdom. Therefore, the 
statement lacked the detail and clarity needed to make the United Kingdom aware that its views were 
opposed by the Marshall Islands.  
As regards the February 2014 statement, the Court stated that it went further than the September 
2013 statement by criticising the conduct of all NWS.151 However, by not naming the United 
Kingdom directly or specifying the conduct which gave rise to the breach, and the fact it was made at 
a conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, not nuclear disarmament, the statement 
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"did not call for a specific reaction by the United Kingdom".152 Therefore, no "opposition of views" 
could be inferred.153 
Secondly, the Court noted that care must be taken in drawing inferences from voting patterns 
within political organs, such as the General Assembly, and that voting patterns in itself cannot 
demonstrate the existence of a dispute.154 This is because a state's vote on any given resolution cannot 
be "indicative of its position on every proposition within that resolution".155 
Thirdly, the Court rejected the Marshall Islands' argument that the filing of the application itself 
could demonstrate the existence of a dispute.156 The filing of the application could be used as evidence 
to confirm the continued existence of a dispute or clarify the scope or subject matter of the dispute, 
but it could not be used to "create a dispute de novo, one that does not already exist".157 
In considering the arguments put forward by the Marshall Islands, the Court, applying the 
awareness requirement, held that the lack of specificity in its prior statements on the cessation of 
nuclear arms and nuclear disarmament meant that the United Kingdom could not be found to have 
been aware that its views were positively opposed by the Marshall Islands.158 This meant the Court 
had no basis to find that a dispute existed. Therefore, the Court had no power to exercise its jurisdiction 
under art 36(2) of the Statute to determine the merits of the case.159 Consequently, the parties never 
had the opportunity to address the substantive issues.  
E Dissents  
All eight judges in their dissenting opinions would have found that a dispute existed between the 
Marshall Islands and the United Kingdom on the date the application was filed.160 They found that 
the statements made by the Marshall Islands at the 2013 and 2014 conferences were enough to 
objectively demonstrate that the parties held opposing views as to their obligations under art VI of the 
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NPT.161 Many of the dissenters also expressed their disapproval of the new awareness requirement.162 
These views will be addressed in detail in Part VI. 
VI A CRITIQUE OF THE REASONING 
This part advances two primary arguments. The first concerns the Court's introduction of a criteria 
of awareness in determining the existence of a dispute. It will be argued that the Court appears to 
deviate from past practice by introducing this requirement. The second relates to the Court's refusal 
to give judgment on the other preliminary objections. Thus, it will be argued that the application of 
the Monetary Gold principle put forward by the United Kingdom might have been a more credible 
avenue for the Court to dismiss the case.  
A Requirement of Awareness in Finding a Dispute 
The awareness requirement appears to shift the determination of a dispute from a flexible, 
pragmatic inquiry into a restrictive and formalistic one. Four arguments will be put forward to 
illustrate that the Court should not have added a requirement of awareness. First, this requirement 
departs from the Court's objective analysis based on an examination of the facts. Secondly, the two 
recent cases relied upon do not appear to propose an awareness requirement. Thirdly, the requirement 
may have startling effects on future cases brought before the ICJ. Finally, this requirement will impact 
the sound administration of justice and judicial economy.  
1 A departure from an objective analysis 
The existence of a dispute is a necessary requirement for the ICJ to exercise its jurisdiction and 
the Court has indicated it should be objectively ascertained.163 However, the awareness requirement 
introduced by the Court appears to be a departure from this objective approach.164 By requiring the 
respondent to be aware that its views are opposed by the applicant, the Court has begun to dive into 
the mind of the respondent state.165 This departure is pointed out by Vice-President Yusuf who 
states:166 
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The function of the Court is to determine the existence of a conflict of legal views on the basis of evidence 
placed before it and not to delve into the consciousness, perception and other mental processes of States 
(provided they do possess such cerebral qualities) in order to find out about their state of awareness. 
Vice-President Yusuf's statement emphasises that the ICJ's role is to examine the evidence before 
the Court in ascertaining whether a dispute exists. However, this requirement impacts on the Court's 
function to do so. This is due to the existence of a dispute now resting on an inquiry into the knowledge 
of the respondent, rather than on an objective determination of the facts before the Court.167  
The introduction of the awareness element is quite ironic considering that in the declaration of 
President Abraham, who accepted that awareness was a hard requirement, it was stated that the Court 
must be highly consistent in its jurisprudence in both the interests of legal security and to avoid any 
suspicion of arbitrariness.168 The Court appears to have done the complete opposite.169 Instead, it 
appears to have introduced an element of subjective awareness arbitrarily, which appears to clash with 
the stated objective determination of whether a dispute exists because the focus shifts to the 
knowledge of the respondent.170  
The Court also emphasised multiple times in its judgment that the respondent having prior notice 
of the applicant's claims is not a requirement in determining whether a dispute exists.171 However, by 
requiring the respondent to be aware its views were "positively opposed by the applicant",172 the 
Court is essentially requiring the respondent to have prior notice for a dispute to exist.173 This is 
because to satisfy the awareness requirement, the surest way would be for an applicant state to give 
prior notice of its legal claims to a respondent state before filing proceedings before the ICJ.174 The 
Court, unfortunately, gives no answer to this contradiction. 
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Furthermore, by requiring the respondent to be aware, the Court is shifting towards formalistic 
reasoning focusing on form and procedure.175 This is because, no matter the significance of the 
substance, the Court is able to dismiss a case on the narrow ground that a respondent was unaware its 
views were opposed by the applicant. Judge Crawford states that this approach "effectively turns a 
non-formalistic requirement into a formalistic one through the use of the term awareness.176 
Ultimately, this requirement fits uneasily with the objective approach the Court has emphasised in the 
past and with statements made by the Court indicating that prior notice is unnecessary.177 
2 The cases relied upon by the Court 
The Court does not give any detailed legal reasoning when introducing the awareness requirement. 
The majority mentions that awareness is reflected in two previous cases and appears to interpret these 
cases as introducing awareness as a hard requirement in determining the existence of a dispute.178 
This section proposes that a reading of the judgments may suggest otherwise.  
(a) Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicaragua v Colombia) 
The Court's reliance on Alleged Violations for its awareness requirement is troubling because at 
the time of the Marshall Islands' oral hearings, the judgment of that case had not been delivered.179 
Therefore, the Marshall Islands (ironically) was not aware that there was an awareness requirement. 
The Court also did not appear to mention this new requirement during the proceedings. 
In that case, the issue was whether a dispute existed between Nicaragua and Colombia. Nicaragua 
initiated proceedings relating to alleged violations by Colombia of Nicaragua's "sovereign rights and 
maritime zones".180 Nicaragua alleged that Colombia refused to comply with a 2012 ICJ decision 
declaring that certain maritime zones belonged to Nicaragua by continuing to assert its sovereignty.181 
There were public statements to this effect made by high ranking Nicaraguan officials.182 
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The Court in Alleged Violations found that the public statements made by Nicaraguan officials 
indicated that prior to the application being filed, Columbia was aware that actions taken by them 
relating to Nicaragua's maritime zones were positively opposed by Nicaragua.183 However, the Court 
in Marshall Islands v United Kingdom appears to have misinterpreted this as authority for the 
awareness requirement.184 In a statement made prior to this finding, the Court in Alleged Violations 
observed that a formal diplomatic protest brought to the attention of the other party is not a necessary 
condition and that determining the existence of a dispute is a matter of substance based on the 
examination of the facts.185 The Court also indicated that it was "apparent from these statements that 
the Parties held opposing views".186 Therefore, the finding that Columbia was aware was solely a 
description of a factual finding to further confirm that the applicant's claims were positively opposed 
and was not, as emphasised by Judges Sebutinde and Crawford, intended to be turned into a 
"formalistic legal requirement" of awareness.187 Furthermore, if it was the intention of the Court to 
deviate from past practice and make this an additional hard requirement in determining the existence 
of a dispute, then it would be reasonable to expect they would expressly mention this.188  
(b) Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation) 
The case of Georgia v Russia involved the interpretation and application of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD).189 Georgia invoked art 22, alleging 
that Russia violated CERD.190 Article 22 was a compromissory clause which required states to first 
attempt a negotiated settlement before proceeding to the ICJ.191 The Court held that there was a 
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dispute.192 However, it did not proceed to determine the merits of the case because the states did not 
comply with art 22 of CERD by attempting to negotiate a settlement before proceeding to the ICJ.193 
The Court in Marshall Islands v United Kingdom relied on certain passages from the Georgia v 
Russia judgment when introducing the awareness requirement. Those passages referred to Russia's 
awareness of parliamentary statements made by the Georgian Parliament,194 and a press release made 
by Georgia's Foreign Ministry.195 Judge Robinson disagreed with the Court's use of those passages 
for introducing the awareness requirement. He stressed that those passages were emphasising whether 
the parliamentary statements and press release revealed a dispute and that the references to Russia's 
awareness were just findings of fact because it did not seem likely that the Court would introduce a 
hard requirement of awareness in such an "indirect and non-transparent manner".196 It also appears to 
be misleading that Georgia v Russian Federation stands for a formal requirement of awareness 
because the proceedings in that case followed an armed conflict between the two states and involved 
a compromissory clause requiring the parties to attempt a negotiated settlement before bringing the 
case to the ICJ. Therefore, it would appear logical that Russia would be aware that its views were 
opposed by Georgia because of their history of conflict and before a negotiated settlement would take 
place.197 
3 Impact of awareness on future cases 
The introduction of an awareness requirement appears to raise the threshold for a dispute to 
exist.198 It also places a higher burden on the applicant state to show that a dispute exists.199 This is 
not necessarily a negative implication. A higher threshold may influence some states to accept the 
jurisdiction of the Court as there will be greater scrutiny before a legal dispute is established and a 
claim proceeds on its merits. It would also promote certainty in international relations because by 
proving awareness, it gives the respondent state an opportunity to act in a specific way. This enables 
the Court to better determine whether the views of the parties are positively opposed.  
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However, a higher threshold may work to limit access to the ICJ and may impact the ICJ's 
credibility as an effective avenue for dispute resolution between states.200 It could cause a case worthy 
of proceeding on its merits, based on its substance, to be dismissed because an applicant is unable to 
get over the "new hurdle"201 of showing awareness on the part of the respondent.202 This runs counter 
to the Court's statements in previous cases where they have said they will always try where possible 
to entertain a case if it has a legal dimension.203  
4 Sound administration of justice and judicial economy 
A strong criticism amongst the dissenting judges is that the awareness requirement will impact 
the sound administration of justice and judicial economy in the ICJ.204 Vice-President Yusuf states 
that if the Court finds that the respondent was not aware that its views were positively opposed, then 
an applicant would be able to get around the awareness requirement by submitting a new application 
before the Court against the respondent.205 In these new proceedings, the previously unmet condition 
of awareness would be satisfied because the respondent would be aware its view were opposed from 
the previous proceedings.206 The consequences of this would create inefficiencies and may run the 
risk of the Court wasting its time hearing an identical case which could have been addressed much 
earlier. The Court has also stated in its jurisprudence that it should not penalise an applicant for a 
defect in procedure which can easily be remedied "by the date when the Court decides on the 
jurisdiction".207 The respondent's awareness that its views were opposed is something which the 
applicant may have been able to easily remedy. Therefore, it would not be in the sound administration 
of justice for an applicant to have to submit new proceedings in order to satisfy this requirement.208 
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It is important to note that this argument has no practical effect on the future of the alleged dispute 
between the Marshall Islands and the United Kingdom. In December 2014, the United Kingdom 
amended its declaration of acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. It was amended to 
exclude "any dispute [that] is substantially the same as a dispute previously submitted by the same or 
another Party".209 In February 2017, it was further amended to exclude any claim regarding nuclear 
weapons:210 
… unless all of the other nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons have also consented to the jurisdiction of the Court and are party to the proceedings in question.  
It is unlikely these conditions will be ever met.211 As such, due to the Court's formalistic and 
unprecedented requirement of awareness, the Court has again missed "a golden opportunity to 
advance the development of international law" regarding nuclear weapons.212 
B Monetary Gold Principle 
The judgment on the preliminary objections is unsatisfactory. The Court only determined that the 
case could not proceed because of an absence of a dispute and did not go on to consider the United 
Kingdom's other preliminary objections.213 However, it was acknowledged by Judges Tomka, Xue, 
Bhandari and Crawford that this was unsatisfactory and that the case could have been better decided 
based on the Monetary Gold principle.214 
1 What is the Monetary Gold principle? 
The principle in the Monetary Gold case applies where a third state, whose position would be 
affected by the decision, is not before the ICJ.215 In such a case, the Court cannot proceed to determine 
the merits of the case unless the third state also consents to come before the ICJ.216 However, for the 
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Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, it must be shown that the legal interests of the absent state 
"would form the very subject matter of the decision".217  
The Monetary Gold case illustrates how the principle applies. That case concerned a quantity of 
monetary gold that was removed from Rome in 1943 by the Germans.218 The gold was found by an 
independent arbitrator to belong to Albania.219 Italy claimed that it was entitled to the gold and 
subsequently brought proceedings to the ICJ against the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of 
Monetary Gold which consisted of the United Kingdom, the United States and France. Italy requested 
the ICJ to determine how much of the gold it had claim to.220 However, the Court refused to exercise 
its jurisdiction. This was because Albania was absent from the proceedings and its legal interests in 
the gold formed the subject matter of the decision.221 
2 Application of the Monetary Gold principle in Marshall Islands v United 
Kingdom 
The NPT is a multilateral treaty requiring the cooperation of all states party to it to negotiate in 
good faith the cessation of nuclear weapons leading to disarmament.222 The Court would not be able 
to rule on the conduct of the United Kingdom without also needing to evaluate the conduct and 
lawfulness of other states who are party to the NPT. This is because the conduct of other states who 
are party to the NPT would also be at issue since the United Kingdom is required to negotiate with 
these other states to achieve the goals set out by the NPT.223 Therefore, the legal interests of other 
NWS, absent in these proceedings, would form the subject matter of the decision.224 
VII THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Nuclear weapons have evolved into an issue that affects the entire globe.225 This Part will address 
how issues of nuclear weapons may be approached in the future. First, it will examine whether the 
threshold for the ICJ to hear nuclear weapon cases should be relaxed and whether a people-centred 
approach to the issue should be taken. Secondly, it will examine whether the ICJ is capable of dealing 
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with issues regarding nuclear weapons. Finally, the reality of achieving nuclear disarmament will be 
addressed. 
A A Relaxed Threshold with a People-Centred Approach 
Judge Cançado Trindade emphasises that the ICJ should have shown sensitivity on this issue and 
"should have given its contribution to a matter which is a major concern of the vulnerable international 
community, and indeed of humankind as a whole".226 This suggests that a lower threshold should be 
adopted by the Court in determining whether a case of global importance should proceed to the 
merits.227 It also suggests the focus should be centred around how the issue impacts the people of the 
world as opposed to the states subject to the proceedings.228 The case brought by the Marshall Islands 
was a case that reflected the concerns of the global community and which suggested the need for the 
Court to be more responsive to the questions raised.229 By taking such an approach, the ICJ "could 
have asserted itself and demonstrated the importance of the law in resolving crucial global issues".230 
However, such an approach may present more difficulties than solutions. If the Court were to 
lower its threshold, then it is likely many NWS would decline to come before the ICJ due to the 
increased number of claims brought against them regarding their obligations under nuclear weapon 
treaties and customary international law. The difficulties of a lower threshold may also extend to the 
Court's ability to determine other issues of global importance, such as climate change. This is because 
many states, who are known to contribute high levels of greenhouse gases, would also decline to come 
before the ICJ.231 The Court may also run the risk of receiving an avalanche of cases and turning into 
a political forum because the focus may shift from deciding legal disputes between states to 
determining the impacts of and solutions to global issues.  
B The ICJ's Capability of Dealing with Nuclear Weapon Issues 
The issue of nuclear weapons is inherently political.232 This appears to be reflected in this case 
where all eight of the judges who found that a dispute did not exist were from NWS or from states 
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which benefit from nuclear deterrence offered by their allies.233 Interpreting this voting pattern, it 
appears likely that judges vote in favour of the national interests of their home state, rather than what 
is in the best interests of the international community as a whole.234 This can impact the ICJ's 
reputation as it is crucial for judges to be impartial and unbiased.235 It also undermines the Court's 
ability to function as a true "world court" on issues where opinions differ greatly among states.236 
Therefore, the issue of nuclear weapons is arguably best dealt with through negotiations between 
states and the implementation of treaties. 
However, proceedings before the Court do not appear to have the effect of the ICJ trespassing on 
the political process. Usually, the Court would be asked to rule on the obligations contained in nuclear 
weapon treaties, which are legal instruments devised by the international community. It is within the 
function of the Court to uphold and interpret these treaties. By doing this, the ICJ can put pressure on 
states and make it clear what their obligations are with respect to nuclear weapons, thus supporting 
the political process.237 
The issue of nuclear disarmament is also of a collective character because it requires the 
cooperation of all NWS.238 For the Court to deal with nuclear weapon issues adequately, it requires 
all NWS to be involved in the proceedings. This is unlikely to happen.239 Furthermore, the bilateral 
function of dealing with a dispute between two states would have no practical effect on any nuclear 
weapon related issues. This is because if the ICJ did proceed to the merits and make an order requiring 
the state to negotiate and fulfil the precise result of nuclear disarmament, it is unlikely that anything 
of substance would happen without the cooperation of all other NWS.  
An example can be found in the Marshall Islands v United Kingdom decision. The United 
Kingdom possesses less than one per cent of the world's total nuclear arsenal.240 Therefore, the effect 
of any judgment would not lead to any progress of achieving nuclear disarmament when countries 
such as the United States and Russia, who possess over 90 per cent of the world's total nuclear arsenal, 
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do not consent to come before the Court in regard to nuclear weapon issues.241 It is also unrealistic to 
expect a state to unilaterally rid itself of nuclear weapons, particularly since one of the main 
justifications for possessing such weapons is deterrence against other NWS.242 As a result, it appears 
there is little the ICJ can do to address the issue. 
C The Reality of Achieving Nuclear Disarmament 
There has been global momentum amongst states and citizens towards achieving nuclear 
disarmament since the Cold War.243 This momentum has been enhanced by a 2009 speech made by 
President Barack Obama (as he then was) where he discussed the necessity of realising a nuclear 
weapon free world.244 Momentum has also grown through the adoption of the Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017.  
However, despite these efforts, the world is still a long way from achieving nuclear disarmament. 
NWS are not interested in signing a disarmament treaty, nor are they interested in participating in fora 
discussing the issue.245 This removes any legitimacy a disarmament treaty would have as legitimacy 
would be drawn from the NWS who become party to it and who ratify it.246  
Moreover, as long as one NWS continues to possess nuclear weapons, other states will attempt to 
acquire them or continue to upgrade their existing arsenals.247 Consequently, the reality of ever 
achieving this objective is in doubt and it is unlikely we will ever escape this stalemate in our lifetime. 
Instead, we must accept that disarmament is a political game and unless the views of every state are 
in harmony, disarmament will never be achieved.  
VIII CONCLUSION 
This article set out to evaluate the decision of the ICJ in Marshall Islands v United Kingdom. The 
Court did not proceed to the merits and dismissed the case because no dispute existed between the 
parties. Two arguments were advanced in criticising the reasoning in this case. First, the Court should 
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not have introduced a new requirement of awareness in determining the existence of a dispute because 
it appears to have deviated from the Court's past jurisprudence in treating the inquiry as an objective 
determination. Secondly, the Court should have addressed the other preliminary objections of the 
United Kingdom and dismissed the case on the grounds of the Monetary Gold principle because the 
interests of other NWS formed the subject matter of the decision.  
The case also, again, illustrated the narrow reasoning adopted by the Court and its reluctance to 
deal with issues concerning nuclear weapons. It emphasised that the role of the Court on such issues 
of global significance is minimal and ought to be left to the political fora of the UN. It is only when 
all states come together in harmony will the world ever be free of such weapons capable of destroying 
us all.  
 
